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Infrastructure asset management: Replacing simple agency 
with faithful stewardship 
Introduction 
This proposed research is about identifying those governance arrangements for large 
engineering infrastructure assets which will assist in obtaining the best possible asset 
management results for the community. 
In Australia there is strong focus on providing additional infrastructure to meet the 
demands of long term population change, heightened economic activity, increased 
export volumes and population growth.  Simultaneously existing assets are not being 
maintained.  The Engineers Australia Report Cards show a concerning picture of 
infrastructure standards predominantly at levels below “very good” and in need of 
increasing attention to ensure they remain “fit for purpose”.1  
Being “fit for purpose” is a state not permanently fixed but rather being continually 
redefined by the expectations of the community, to meet its own immediate needs or 
to meet the needs of future generations.  That expectation to provide infrastructure 
which is continually relevant places the actors responsible for infrastructure assets, 
governments, private sector providers and asset management professionals, in the 
challenging position of steward of the asset eg. the road system or electricity 
generator. 
                                                 
1 cited in Institute of Public Works Engineering Australia “Sustainable Communities: Critical Insights 
2006. 
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The essence of the role of steward in our society is that of a servant who has a defined 
obligation to look to the interests of particular individuals or groups.  The extent of 
the expectation that those entrusted with infrastructure assets will act as a steward for 
present and future generations will be examined in this research. 
Key to this consideration of such stewardship roles is an understanding of the trend 
for asset management to move from a reactive asset maintenance approach to a 
proactive, strategic-level focus highly integrated with all decision-making involving 
the asset.  Challengingly, the organisational context in which those decisions are taken 
is not merely that of the one organisation.  Private and government owned 
organisations provide engineering infrastructure to the community with many 
government assets being so large that the governance structure is constituted by a mix 
of private and government organisations.  Each is allocated to separate roles eg. 
policy, ownership, operation, maintenance responsibility and maintenance work. 
This thesis will evaluate the contribution of these multi-organisation governance 
arrangements for engineering infrastructure assets, this public/private mix, to 
obtaining the best possible asset management stewardship outcome. 
The issue 
Asset managers are finding themselves subjected to contrary expectations.  They are 
required to do more with less, achieve within increasing accountability constraints, 
and meet heightening community expectations as to availability of the asset, the asset 
meeting the requirements of the community, all with the options of obsolescence and 
demolition being in increasing disfavour.  Integral to those expectations is the inherent 
responsibility of individuals and organisations with an asset management role to be 
the steward of those assets, protecting and enhancing the asset to meet the needs of 
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the community and future generations.  To adequately fulfil that role decisions as to 
the infrastructure asset must be taken at the strategic level but the extent of this 
practice is not sufficient to consistently categorise asset management decisions as 
corporate strategy decisions (Tranfield et al 2004). 
Additional complexity is introduced to the integration of infrastructure asset 
management decision-making into corporate strategy decision-making if the 
governance arrangements involve more than one organisation.  This is increasingly 
the case with engineering infrastructure assets because their scale is so large that 
operation is often separate from policy and operation can be separate from ownership. 
There is not an adequate understanding of the impact of governance structures 
comprised of more than one organisation, with a mix of government owned or 
privately owned organisations, upon the stewardship outcome for engineering 
infrastructure assets. 
Research objectives 
The literature on asset management has traditionally focused on restoration of the 
asset and more lately the integration of decision-support systems and the need for 
asset management decisions within the organisation to also be taken at the strategic 
level.  The consideration of the levels within the organisation at which EAM decisions 
must be taken eg. operational, tactical or strategic (Amadi-Echendu et al 2007) has 
remained limited to models involving the one organisation, extending beyond the one 
organisation only to examine the outsourcing of maintenance tasks.  There is not an 
adequate understanding of the impact of governance structures comprised of a mix of 
government owned and privately owned organisations, upon the stewardship outcome 
of engineering infrastructure assets. 
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The objectives of this research are to understand the benefits and disadvantages of 
such multiple-organisation governance structures and in turn to develop a model that 
will assist in the optimisation of the stewardship outcome. 
Research question 
In seeking to evaluate the multiple-organisation governance structure it will be 
necessary to establish a baseline or “benchmark” model or governance structure 
against which the multiple-organisation governance structure can be compared.  That 
benchmark can be the model where the one organisation performs the roles of policy, 
ownership and maintenance. 
Accordingly that comparison between the multiple-organisation governance structure 
and that for a single organisation is reflected in the following research question: 
Does a governance structure comprised of both government owned and privately 
owned organisations achieve a better engineering infrastructure asset 
management stewardship outcome than governance by a single government 
entity? 
Table of terms 
The proposed research will more precisely define several terms eg. asset management, 
infrastructure governance and steward which are key to this examination of the 
governance arrangements for engineering infrastructure assets.  In the interim, various 
terms are defined to focus the consideration of issues through this paper. 
“Engineering Asset Management(EAM)” – Until more precisely defined by the 
research proposed in this paper it is of assistance to adopt the following definition of 
Strategic Asset Management (SAM) developed by Too et al (2006) as an interim 
definition of EAM: 
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“Strategic Asset Management - A strategic and systematic process of optimising 
decision-making in resources allocation with the goal of achieving planned 
alignment of infrastructure asset with service demand throughout its lifecycle.” 
“Infrastructure governance“ - Governance is the structure of roles and 
interrelationships between or within the organisations that comprise the mechanism 
for strategic level decision making for the engineering infrastructure asset. 
“Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)” – Public Private Partnerships are long-term 
contracts between government and private business for a combination of services, 
construction, or financing in return for some combination of public funds, public 
assets, or user fees (Bloomfield 2006). 
“Steward” – A servant who has a defined obligation to look to the interests of 
particular individuals or groups, living or yet to be born.   
Outline of this paper 
This paper will consider the literature from the varied fields relevant to infrastructure 
governance, organisational forms, contemporary governance arrangements and then 
infrastructure stewardship encompassing asset management, stewardship and 
stewardship theory. 
The research question emerging from that literature is developed and key aspects of 
the research methodology are then examined. 
Literature Review 
The literature pertinent to both the stewardship responsibilities inherent in engineering 
infrastructure asset management and the multi-organisation governance arrangements 
for such assets is only now emerging being drawn from a broad range of disciplines. 
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In this section aspects of infrastructure governance, the history of organisation types 
utilised with engineering infrastructure assets and contemporary arrangements will be 
examined.  In turn, aspects of infrastructure stewardship, the nature of asset 
management, the need for a definition of engineering asset management, the 
challenges attaching to engineering asset management, the context of stewardship in 
society and stewardship theory will be examined. 
Infrastructure governance 
Examination of governance structures comprised of a mix of government owned and 
privately owned organisations will be assisted by the application of one or all of the 
three perspectives developed by Thynne (2006) for the examination of the mix of 
public and private activity in public governance and the management of public affairs.  
Thynne (2006) identified three perspectives, all interrelated, from which the mix can 
be considered.  The first is the allocation of roles to the state, the market or civil 
society.  The second is the organisation types and their interaction.  The third is the 
activities, functions, relationships and support. 
Thynne’s second perspective, that of examining the organisation types and their 
interaction, will be adopted to assist in the understanding of the intended roles of the 
organisations and the principal/agent and stewardship relationships of the 
organisations.  Considering the interactions between organisations will further the 
understanding of benefits to be gained from applying stewardship theory to the 
relationship between entities involved in the individual infrastructure asset.  Within 
organisational interaction Thynne (2006) specified three broad forms, separation with 
cooperation, separation with cooperation and collaboration, and separation with 
cooperation, collaboration and conflation.  It is this latter form which exemplifies a 
fusion of state, market and society needs, goals, objectives, resources, all of which 
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aligns with the stewardship theory ideal and which offers potential to maximise the 
stewardship outcome for infrastructure assets. 
This section of the paper will consider the organisation types historically used to 
provide engineering infrastructure assets in Australia and then examine in greater 
detail the organisation types currently in use.  
History 
From the mid 19th century the influential British experience was of multi-functional 
ministerial departments being supported by local councils and, to a lesser extent, 
specific-function boards and trusts (Wettenhall 2003).  Early in Australia’s colonial 
period both departments and statutory authorities were utilised.  With the forming of 
the newly self-governing states the 1860’s saw major development programs, 
particularly state railway systems, technical and commercial activities for which the 
ministerial departments and the general public service were considered inappropriate.  
Statutory authorities for these “government in business” purposes were utilised and 
strengthened with the legal status of corporate bodies and were known as statutory 
corporations (Whettenhall 2005). 
The statutory authority continues to be utilised by the Australian and State 
parliaments but statutory corporations were displaced in the 1980’s and 1990’s by 
government owned companies utilising corporations law passed primarily for the 
private sector (Thynne 1994, Wettenhall 2003). 
Government owned companies were formed to facilitate privatisation of government 
activities (Wettenhall 1998) or to facilitate participation in competitive tendering and 
other New Public Management (NPM) (Hood 1991) level playing field contractual 
arrangements in response to ‘contracting out’ initiatives (Hood 1997).  The ease of 
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administratively establishing the company, in addition to the matter not being required 
to go before parliament, make the forming of companies attractive to Governments 
and bureaucrats.  The company offers the flexibility to arrange the shareholding so as 
to facilitate sale to the private sector (Wettenhall 2005) and for ownership by any one, 
or a partnership of members of the executive (Ministers), government entities, other 
governments and private bodies (Thynne 1994).  This recent increase in use of the 
company at the same time as interest in governance and partnership has increased is 
seen by Wettenhall (2004) as possibly a conceptual antidote to high levels of 
commercializing, marketizing and privatising with partnerships emerging as an 
accommodationist option, as a retreat from the hard-line advocacy of privatisation 
(Linder 2000). 
In parallel with the use by governments of ministerial departments, statutory 
authorities and companies the private sector has provided or operated infrastructure 
assets, either in concert with government or independently.  The organisation form is 
the company, either where the shares are privately owned or publicly listed. 
Contemporary governance 
In addition to companies, privately or government owned, engineering infrastructure 
assets are now owned, operated or managed by the full range of organisation types 
including departments, statutory authorities and statutory corporations.  Importantly 
many are governed by a combination of two or more of these organisation types. 
The typical arrangements which are currently in use are a range of contractual 
relationships between government departments, statutory corporations, government 
companies and private companies.  The formal relationships are specified in contracts 
and can be relatively straight-forward, involving outsourcing of certain functions or 
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the delivery of services or can be a more complex combination of relationships 
between organisations, falling under the Private Public Partnership (PPP) label.  
PPP’s focus on public-private partnerships and do not include alliances, which are 
private-private (Weihe 2007). 
Public Private Partnership is a label with extremely broad meaning, encompassing 
virtually any relationships between the public and private sectors, they can include 
relationships with non-profit organisations and may have funds gifted by the private 
sector or public funds may be provided (Bloomfield 2006).  In turn there is a narrower 
form of PPPs having long-term contracts between government and private business 
for a combination of services, construction, or financing in return for some 
combination of public funds, public assets, or user fees (Bloomfield 2006).  Brown 
(2007) describes these as essentially financing strategies that are used world-wide 
where governments maintain ownership and control of the assets but receive financial 
compensation to contract with a private operator who provides operating, 
maintenance, and/or construction expertise for large-scale infrastructure projects.  For 
the private organisation the benefit may be an upfront amount, and/or an ongoing 
annuity.  For the government it is an opportunity to create a needed element of the 
infrastructure or raise funding to apply to other uses.  However the purposes of PPP’s, 
even in the narrow field of infrastructure are much broader with governments seeking 
partners with otherwise scarce financing and design expertise, construction skills and 
operational effectiveness. 
Outsourcing of service delivery can be arranged by contract with a suitable 
organisation.  This research will include those cases where delivery of a significant, 
core service is outsourced to a separate organisation and in respect of the asset 
management function those cases where the complete asset management function has 
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been allocated to an organisation discrete from those involved in the governance of 
the infrastructure asset.  The situation where only aspects of asset management have 
been outsourced will not be considered in this research. 
Infrastructure stewardship 
Infrastructure stewardship is a recently forming perspective emerging as a key 
element of asset management theory.  This section will examine the development of 
asset management theory, in particular engineering asset management (EAM), the 
specialised field within asset management which applies to major infrastructure 
assets.  The challenges facing EAM, funding constraints, heightening risk and 
accountability and community expectations will be examined.  In turn, the community 
expectation that asset management individuals and organisations take a stewardship 
role in respect of the asset will be examined, commencing with an examination of the 
general stewardship role in our society and a comparable industry, the North 
American forest wood industry and then moving to stewardship theory.   
Asset management 
There is a substantial body of literature considering asset management in a range of 
contexts, with the same asset seen from the perspectives of various professional 
disciplines and there being different meanings attributed to the term “asset 
management”.  Whilst “asset management” can mean the management of financial 
assets (Riahi-Belkaoui & Pavlik 1991) eg. cash, bonds, derivatives or information 
technology systems, it is the management of those physical assets constituting the 
infrastructure serving the community which is the focus of this thesis. 
Asset management has historically focused on the maintenance of assets with strategic 
decisions being confined to the how of maintenance.  Asset maintenance developed, 
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progressively, forming into four dimensions: service-delivery options; organisation 
and work structuring; maintenance methodology and support systems, particularly the 
use of information technology systems, and e-maintenance systems (Tsang 2002).  
Asset management has taken a strong focus on two, key, related areas, the information 
and communication technology necessary to manage the assets data and the 
integration and management of the engineering asset management systems so as to 
best support decision-making (Cagle 2003, Vanier 2001, Halfaway 2006, Amadi-
Echendu et al 2007).   
In turn this narrow focus on key strategies to support asset management has been 
challenged with propositions that infrastructure asset management be strategic and 
comprehensive, extending from the sustainment tasks such as preventative 
maintenance and repairs to encompass restoration and modernisation tasks such as 
replacement due to obsolescence and change-in-use modifications (Lufkin et al 2005) 
and disposal (Clausen 2006).  Thus asset management encompasses decision-making 
at the operational level and the strategic level (Too 2006) but the focus of this thesis is 
at the strategic level, evaluating issues impacting upon the governance of engineering 
infrastructure assets. 
Tranfield et al (2004) observed that in response to assets being the third most 
expensive item for businesses real estate and infrastructure are now being seen as 
assets requiring active stewardship.  They surveyed 25 public and private sector 
organisations in the United Kingdom to understand how managers were addressing 
the Strategic Management of Long Term Assets (SMoLTA) and brought the findings 
together as a framework to help managers in aligning corporate and infrastructure 
strategy  The framework is shown diagrammatically in Figure 1 below: 
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This framework by its design offers an example of the type of framework which 
might be developed to assist in evaluation of the achievement of the stewardship 
outcome and by its content identifies areas of importance which might be considered 
when developing the research methodology and instruments.  The possible limitation 
of this framework is that it is developed from research of companies where the one 
organisation fulfils all roles and the framework is similarly limited in that it is 
intended to assist the review of actions within only one organisation. 
Corporate Strategy 
“What business are we in?” 
“What are we trying to achieve?” 
“What business do we want to be in?” 
“What kind of product/services do we want to provide?” 
“What are the core or sovereign parts of our business?” 
Asset Strategy 
“What assets do I need to achieve strategic purpose?” 
“What is the overriding purpose and function of the asset base?” 
“What are the goals to be achieved through the effective management of the asset base?” 
Asset Knowledge 
“What assets do I own?” 
“What types of assets can I lever?” 
“How many of these assets exist?” 
“Where are these assets located?” 
Asset Monitoring 
“Is the asset range broad enough?” 
“Is the current delivery acceptable?” 
“Are the assets fit for purpose?” 
“What is the rate of asset deterioration?” 
“What are the alternatives?” 
Asset Management and Operational Level 
“What should we sustain?” 
“What should we acquire?” 
“What should we divest?” 
“Which of the planned activities should be provided in-house?” 
“Which of the planned activities should be outsourced?” 
Planning for Capital Investment 
“What is the value (actual, book, replacement) of the asset base?” 
“What is worth spending and when?” 
Intervention Decisions 
“How might assets be classified in order to facilitate TPM?” 
“Which combination of interventions provides the best balance of costs, risks and 
performance over the entire life of the asset?” 
Managing the SMoLTA 
“How do I manage the change to a strategic approach?” 
“How do I get the staff/stakeholders to follow?” 
“How do I improve create a stewardship culture?” 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Figure 1. 
An algorithm for the 
strategic management 
of long term assets 
Why should I be bothered? 
What should I do about it? 
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Defining Engineering Asset Management (EAM) 
The focus of this paper is upon engineering infrastructure assets, particularly those 
which are unique or so large that the options of demolition and replacement are 
precluded.  Preliminary to the consideration of EAM the available definitions of asset 
management from several sources are considered, particularly to identify whether a 
strategic decision making role is envisaged and whether the stewardship responsibility 
has been considered. 
Cagle (2003) defines infrastructure asset management in the North American context 
as a set of processes or activities addressing the proactive management of capital 
assets and/or infrastructure as follows: 
• Maintaining a systematic record of individual assets (an inventory) with regard 
to acquisition cost, original and remaining useful life, physical condition, and 
cost history for repair and maintenance; 
• Having a defined program for sustaining the aggregate body of assets through 
planned maintenance, repair, and/or replacement; 
• Implementing and managing information systems in support of these elements. 
 
This definition specifies what is done but does not specify the strategic perspective 
nor the purpose or outcome following from the actions.  The definition, and indeed 
the example in Cagle’s paper, are based around a single organisation which owns and 
operates the engineering asset eg. road, bridge, tunnel. 
The British Standards Institute (BSI) in 2003 published the first publicly available 
specification for the “Optimal Management of Physical Infrastructure Assets” the 
Asset Management Standard (PAS-55) which defines Asset Management as: 
“Systematic and coordinated activities and practices through which an 
organization optimally manages its physical assets and their associated 
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performance, risks and expenditures over their lifecycles for the purpose of 
achieving its organizational strategic plan.” 
That definition directly links asset management to the achievement of the 
organisation’s strategic plan but does not emphasise that asset management itself is 
most effective when decisions as to the asset are taken at the strategic level, as well as 
the operational level (Too et al 2006).  Further the British Standards Institute’s 
definition contemplates the organisation optimising the performance of the asset to 
achieve the organisation’s strategic plan.  Whilst the BSI definition could be 
interpreted to mean that the organisational strategic plan is the device to specify the 
relationship with the community and users, which in the case of engineering 
infrastructure assets would be stewardship, the importance of the stewardship role 
requires that it be set out in any EAM-specific definition. 
A definition of asset management which contemplates the engineering infrastructure 
asset environment was developed by Too et al (2006) drawing together themes from 
published polices and best practice guidelines to provide the following definition as 
an element of an integrative strategic infrastructure asset management framework: 
“Strategic Asset Management - A strategic and systematic process of 
optimising decision-making in resources allocation with the goal of achieving 
planned alignment of (the) infrastructure asset with service demand throughout 
its lifecycle.” 
This definition advances the link between strategic decision-making and the asset 
meeting the service demand and is not limited in scope to the decision-making and 
assets being within the one organisation.  However the obligation to current and future 
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generations, the stewardship role is only partly addressed with there being no 
specification of the responsibility to future generations. 
The work of Too et al (2006) provides a useful base for the development of a 
definition which recognises the operational and strategic stewardship responsibilities 
inherent in engineering infrastructure asset management. 
To anchor the hypothesis of this thesis it will be necessary to precisely define asset 
management as a role with strategic dimensions and long-term stewardship 
responsibilities. 
Challenges for EAM 
The global movement towards the current, broad role for engineering asset 
management has been prompted by a combination of forces.  Legal enforcements, 
government regulation, government funding, financial reporting standards, physical 
security, and general best practice management initiatives have combined to require 
that infrastructure asset managers proactively sustain the infrastructure through 
maintenance, repair, and replacement (Cagle 2003). 
The underlying causes of many of those impacting issues have been a shortage of 
funding, the increasing risk of operating engineering infrastructure assets and 
consequent accountability requirements, and heightening community expectations. 
The funding shortage may be attributed to the global competitive environment 
pressuring asset management operators to do more with less whilst they are pressured 
to spend less (Mather 2003).  Jolicoeur & Barrett (2004) identify the shortage of life-
cycle renewal funds for the North American public building infrastructure leading to a 
higher than acceptable level of deferred maintenance, resulting in rapid deterioration 
of the physical infrastructure.  Alternatively this shortage of maintenance funding is 
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caused by public interest, especially that of elected officials, being focused on new 
construction or major renovations and, consequently, less on the sustainability of 
current infrastructure.  Lufkin et al (2005) observes that maintenance activities rarely 
have the same cachet as ribbon-cutting ceremonies for new construction.  Another 
perspective is that of Tranfield & Denyer (2004) who suggest that the recent 
understanding of the real extent of the under-funding of UK infrastructure assets 
maintenance may have been exposed by the privatisation of public utilities. 
This concentration on immediate profitability manifests as “short-termism” 
(Woodhouse 2001) at the expense of asset longevity and in the US has reached the 
stage where the objective of asset management now is to proactively manage the 
situation before reaching “dire-need” status (Cagle 2003). 
The response by asset managers to this shortage of funds has not been to purport to 
resolve the funding crisis but rather to focus on information technology based 
information systems or decision support systems to provide credible empirical 
estimates of the restoration and modernization costs to support the case for the 
required funds (Lufkin et al 2005) and to facilitate the allocation of limited funds to 
life-cycle renewal efforts of highest priority (Jolicoeur & Barrett 2004). 
In respect of heightening risk and accountability Mather (2004) observes that those 
responsible for the management of major physical assets will be more likely to be 
called to account when there is a failure of the asset, citing the Longford refinery 
disaster in Australia, the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal, India and the Exxon-
Valdez environmental disaster.  Consequently higher standards for legislative and 
regulatory compliance and internal requirements to eliminate risk to corporate image 
were introduced.  He observes that irrespective of outsourcing of the responsibility for 
maintaining the asset that there is only one asset owner and that owner remains 
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responsible for the legal ramifications of actions of all parties involved.  He advises 
that asset owners need to retain strict control of judgement as to what should be done 
in respect of the asset, having the full knowledge of the corporate objectives and 
needs to retain control over how things should be done. 
Public values as to infrastructure asset management have remained substantially based 
on economic rationalist principles resulting in ‘short-termism’ ie. profit at the expense 
of longevity (Woodhouse 2001) where maintenance funding provides only for the 
continuation of the present use and little or no regard to use by future generations or 
to the transition to other use or disposal. 
Yet paradoxically the community is expressing discomfort and opposition to the 
destruction, closing down of assets and the sell-off of public assets provoking 
discussion around stewardship of assets and suggesting strong objectives of 
sustainability of use, indeed use and reuse beyond the original objective/purpose. 
Notwithstanding public values generally now emphasising sustainability and 
intergenerational obligation there is no significant debate between the community, 
owners and asset managers as to the responsibility to future generations and the 
stewardship responsibility. 
This thesis will develop further the understanding of the stewardship responsibilities 
inherent in the management of engineering infrastructure assets.  Further, the 
development of aspirational principles of asset stewardship would serve as a standard 
against which the suitability of engineering asset management decisions and practice 
can be evaluated. 
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Stewardship 
Expectations as to stewardship of engineering infrastructure assets are rooted in public 
values and exemplified in the roles of elected officials, public employees and in the 
private sector where individuals and organisations accept the role of trustee for 
financial and property assets undertaking to meet the specified responsibilities to 
others, living or yet to be born. 
This section will consider this collective environment of stewardship and then give 
particular regard to examples of stewardship in major industries having similarity to 
the circumstances of infrastructure assets. 
Stewardship has a long history commencing with usage to describe a church based 
role, to a very broad use in a wide range of policy, beliefs, practices, and usage in the 
sciences, the common thread being a responsibility to honour commitments to others. 
The Old Testament parable of Joseph, the Pharaoh’s steward, portrays a steward as a 
selfless servant who manages assets without owning them, anticipates future trends 
and devises grand plans (Saltman & Ferroussier-Davis 2000).  The New Testament 
parable of the talents, in which a master divides his goods between his three servants, 
emphasises that when entrusted with something of value the steward has an obligation 
to improve it (Saltman & Ferroussier-Davis 2000). 
In modern times the Oxford English Dictionary defines stewardship as, 
“The management of property by a servant on behalf of its owner…” 
(OED, 2007). 
Current usage is very broad.  Healthcare practitioners have identified stewardship 
responsibilities in the application of antibiotics.  The problems of escalating antibiotic 
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resistance and difficult-to-treat infections have led to the development of 
“antimicrobial stewardship” which involves the optimal selection, dose and duration 
of therapy (Fishman 2006, Paskovaty et al 2005).  In fundraising (Worley & Little 
2002) applied a stewardship framework of four parts: reciprocity (by which the 
fundraising organisation demonstrates gratitude for supportive beliefs and 
behaviours); responsibility (the organisation acting in a socially responsible manner to 
those who have supported it); reporting (as a basic requirement of accountability) and 
relationship nurturing. 
Environmental stewardship has progressively developed into a form of governance 
(Gray & Hatchard 2007) comprised of all forces driving the environment related 
agenda forward, including government regulations, economic incentives, and social 
pressures.  Gray & Hatchard (2007) observe that the many actors have differing 
viewpoints but that these can be characterised as the nature-conservation conception 
and the sustainable-development conception. 
For the modern function of management of large corporations the stewardship concept 
is characterised as a feature of the principal-agent relationship.  The agent is assumed 
to safeguard the resources of the principal but expectations of corporate audiences are 
historically skewed towards financial, “bottom-line” performance rather than other 
attributes of corporation performance (Riahi-Belkaoui & Pavlik 1991).  That 
principal-agent relationship is considered to have evolved over time in four successive 
periods with the stewardship role changing in character (Birnberg 1980).  Birnberg 
(1980) considered the demands facing accounting in attempting to supply diverse 
groups with the differing sets of data they desire and developed the notion that 
accounting is trying to describe a complex stewardship relationship and that there are 
really many variations upon the relationship between the steward/custodian and the 
  Page 20 of 36 
David Mills –- Brisbane March 2008   
owner of the assets in the principal-agent relationship. Birnberg (1980) observes that 
for practical purposes the stewardship relationship can be categorised into the four 
observable orientations set out in Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2 Birnberg 
Stages of stewardship relationship 
 
 Pure custodial 
stage 
Traditional 
custodial 
stage 
 
Asset 
utilisation 
stage 
 
Open ended 
stage 
 
Example protect valuables maintain sheep, 
plants 
trade in sheep, 
cattle  
buy, sell real 
estate, invest 
proceeds in 
equities 
Essence return the corpus 
intact 
return the 
corpus 
intact 
 
corpus need not 
remain same, 
convert assets 
corpus 
changes form 
and is 
measured in 
general  
(financial) 
terms 
Charge/task merely protect 
the asset 
protect and give 
attention to, and 
grow the asset 
target for 
growth is set 
target for 
growth is set 
Steward’s 
role 
low skill level possess, apply 
skills & due 
care 
exercise 
judgment, 
initiative 
responsibility 
assumed by  
servant 
Comparable 
control 
level 
Operational 
control 
Operational 
control 
Managerial 
control 
Strategic 
control  
 
  Page 21 of 36 
David Mills –- Brisbane March 2008   
Saner & Wilson (2003) examined the then current usages of the term “stewardship” 
and observed that there are narrow meanings categorised as an engagement or 
consultation process, a system of government oversight, or voluntary initiatives by an 
industry.  Saner & Wilson (2003) propose that stewardship be understood broadly as a 
governance process encompassing the roles and relations of government, industry, 
and the public. 
These examples of stewardship have in common themes of obligation to advance the 
interests of others and those interests of others being in the longer timeframe, not 
short-term. 
Examples where stewardship is practised in industries where physical assets are 
managed over similar timeframes to those applying to engineering infrastructure 
assets would assist in understanding of alternate forms of stewardship and the 
governance mechanisms which achieve the stewardship outcome.  
The forestry sector with its focus on sustainability over an asset life which aligns with 
infrastructure asset life cycles offers a useful parallel, particularly if it can be 
ascertained that forestry governance arrangements, even in a single case, have 
achieved success.  That industry can therefore prospectively be examined for 
learnings which can be applied to asset management. 
Within the North American wood market the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) 
operates a market-based certification and labelling scheme which is most successful in 
the do-it-yourself retail sector.  The FSC is a multi-stakeholder NGO with members 
from civil society, environmental groups and the industry supply chain.  Verdonk et al 
(2007) consider the FSC to be one of the world’s most successful forest certification 
schemes.  However Verdonk et al (2007) question the overall added value of FSC in 
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improving forest management practices and protecting the world’s forest as large-
scale member producers would independently have good management practices.  
Verdonk et al (2007) categorise the FSC arrangement as belonging to the Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) model of governance systems.  However the CSR model 
requires active, conscious consumers (Verdonk et al 2007) and many infrastructure 
assets do not have a market and attendant consumers. 
Caution will be necessary, and particular attention will need to be given to whether a 
model based on active market forces can be translated to the infrastructure asset 
management situation where major assets may be in a monopoly supply situation. 
Stewardship theory 
The movement to stewardship theory, encompassing an organising framework for 
analysis of relationships between parties to contracts (Davis & Schoorman 1997), is a 
relatively recent development. The stewardship relationship literature flows from the 
established agency theory, also known as the principal-agent model. 
Agency theory has its origins in finance and economics (Muth & Donaldson 1998) 
being used as a framework for describing relationships that reflect underlying 
contractual arrangements, between organizations, boards and managers and 
employees, in all sectors, private, public and non-profit.  Agency theory is based on 
the model of man as being a rational actor who seeks to maximize his or her 
individual utility even at the expense of the utility accruing to the principal.  An 
example is the executive in the role of agent manages the corporation’s assets to 
maximize the utility to the executive, not to the employing corporation (the principal).  
In addition to this conflict of goals the model contains the assumption that the agent 
has more information than the principal (Waterman & Meier 1998). 
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This continual conflict results in a cost, an agency cost, to the principal ( Jensen & 
Meckling 1976, Jensen & Meckling 1994) which the principal either bears or 
minimises.  However the agency model is an economic model that in the case of 
infrastructure assets, with rare exceptions such as fully privatised water or electricity, 
is invariably being applied in an institutional or regulatory environment resulting in 
the principal not having the incentives to minimise that agency cost.  In the economic 
model the principal as buyer of the services bears the cost of not adequately 
monitoring the agent’s behaviour, usually in the form of higher fees or less than 
intended quality of performance.  In the institutional or regulatory model a principal 
such as a legislature which decides not to monitor or police its bureaucratic agents or 
private sector service provider agents is unlikely to bear any cost of the agent’s failure 
but rather the cost of sub-standard performance is passed to the general public 
(Waterman & Meier 1998).  However the general public may act as principal at the 
polls and act against its agent, appointing new agents, the elected officials. 
Stewardship theory extends beyond the economic interpretation underpinning agency 
theory giving attention to non-economic influences, the psychological (such as 
identification and power) and the situational (management philosophy and power).  
The key assumption is that directors (Donaldson & Davis 1991), managers and staff 
(Davis & Schoorman 1997 and Van Slyke 2007) are trustworthy and are inherently 
motivated to act in the interests of the principal, even to the detriment of the agent, 
with the potential for the goals of the agent and principal to be perfectly aligned 
(Davis, et al. 1997).  This potential to increase the benefit to the principal by the agent 
acting as a steward is thought to be limited by the parties not being in agreement as to 
the nature of the relationship and the principal not being willing to take risks on the 
conduct of the agent (Van Slyke 2007). 
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Thus stewardship theory is not merely about the role of the organisation entrusted 
with the role of steward but rather it is about the relationship of the steward to the 
principal.  Stewardship theory offers many opportunities to enhance the outcome of 
infrastructure asset management.  Stewardship theory highlights the limitations of the 
strict agency model and through the framework of psychological and situational 
factors identified by Davis & Schoorman (1997) facilitates the consideration of the 
features of current infrastructure asset governance arrangements and the development 
of a template for assisting decision-making in respect of governance of future 
infrastructure assets. 
The limitation of the research to date is that the relationships which have been 
examined are within the organisation ie. between shareholders and boards, between 
owners and management.  The work of Van Slyke (2007 ) is the exception, evaluating 
the relationships between NGO human service providers and the governments of New 
York City and New York State.  This thesis can seek to understand the extent of 
stewardship relationships between organisations involved in the governance of an 
engineering infrastructure asset. 
Research question 
The emerging concern as to the achievement of an outcome from the engineering 
infrastructure asset which meets the needs of current and future generations, the 
stewardship requirement, brings attention to the issue of whether asset management 
practice is appropriately constructed and positioned to achieve the outcome.   
The key issue is whether asset management decisions are genuinely made at the 
strategic level so as to achieve the optimum alignment between the asset management 
actions and the achievement of the stewardship objective. 
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The literature considering those strategic decisions typically examines the model of 
those asset management decisions being taken within the one organisation, such 
single organisation being responsible for all aspects of the governance of the asset.  
However increasingly the governance of engineering infrastructure assets is arranged 
across more than one organisation.  In addition, the recourse by government to PPP 
arrangements or the contracting to privately owned organisations of operations or 
maintenance roles raises the question as to whether the multi-organisation governance 
structure constituted by a mix of government owned and privately owned 
organisations provides a better stewardship outcome.  
In seeking to evaluate the multiple-organisation governance structure it will be 
necessary to establish a baseline or “benchmark” model or governance structure 
against which the multiple-organisation governance structure can be compared.  That 
benchmark can be the model where the one organisation performs the roles of policy, 
ownership, operations and maintenance. 
Accordingly that comparison between the multiple-organisation governance structure 
and that for a single organisation is reflected in the following research question: 
Does a governance structure comprised of both government owned and 
privately owned organisations achieve a better engineering infrastructure asset 
management stewardship outcome than governance by a single government 
entity? 
Research methodology 
The methodology will be the conduct of case studies utilising a predetermined initial 
framework of criteria applied by way of structured interview and then survey of 
interviewees based on a revised framework of criteria against which the interviewees 
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are scored.  That primary data will be analysed and conclusions reached, including the 
formation of a template of criteria for assessing the stewardship achievement of 
governance arrangements comprised of more than one organisation. 
Presently the formation of the research methodology is necessarily incomplete but the 
following discussion outlines the anticipated key elements of the methodology. 
Defining engineering asset management – The work of Too et al (2006) provides a 
useful base for the development of a definition which recognises the operational and 
strategic stewardship responsibilities inherent in engineering infrastructure asset 
management.  Issues to be addressed include the governance arrangement involving 
more than one organisation and responsibilities to current and future generations.   
Measuring & comparing stewardship performance - The evaluation of the 
effectiveness of any governance arrangement will be dependent upon measures of an 
“…engineering infrastructure asset management stewardship outcome…”.  In turn it 
will be necessary to have a method of comparing the performance of one organisation 
against the other using those measures. 
It will be necessary to conduct further research to identify options as to measures of 
comparison. 
“Categorising elements of Infrastructure Governance“ – The governance 
arrangements of each participant organisation will be categorised to provide precision 
of description and to allow comparison of the roles and interrelationships between or 
within the organisations.  This consideration of those roles and relationships will be 
assisted by the framework developed by Thynne (2003) which takes a largely legal-
structural perspective having regard to the legal instrument that establishes the 
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organisation, the. “apex” (the board or statutory officer), the organisation’s legal 
power, ownership, financing, staffing and outsourcing. 
Design of initial questionnaire – To effectively carry out the case studies it will be 
necessary to elicit data from the participant organisations utilising repeatable methods, 
yet those methods must additionally have the capacity to identify issues and insights 
which were not contemplated at the time of developing the research technique.  
Accordingly it is intended to carry out a phase of exploratory research comprised of 
open-ended questions and structured questions . 
The scope of the questions will be finalised after further research but might be 
informed by the framework of questions which constitute Tranfield et al’s (2004) 
strategic management of long-term assets framework plus the organisational type and 
their interaction framework established by Thynne (2006).  Utilising Thynne’s 
framework will provide understanding of the intended roles of the entities and the 
principal/agent and stewardship relationships.  Considering the interactions between 
entities will further the understanding of benefits to be gained from applying 
stewardship theory to the relationship between entities involved in the individual 
infrastructure asset. 
In addition the nature of the relationships which exist within and between participant 
organisations can be explored utilising the framework of psychological and situational 
factors identified by Davis & Schoorman (1997) to develop questions to be put by 
way of the structured elements of the initial interview.  Questions will be formed to 
ascertain which of Birnberg’s (1988) four “observable orientations” the participant 
organisations have to the stewardship role. 
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Selection of case studies - The main research methodology used is the case study.  
These case studies will be used to identify features of governance mechanisms which 
contribute to effective stewardship and inturn will be used to develop a template or 
model to be applied when determining the governance arrangements for future 
engineering infrastructure assets. 
The criteria for selection of case studies will include satisfaction of the basic 
requirement of being either a single-organisation governance arrangement over major 
engineering infrastructure assets or  governance structures comprised of more than 
one entity, including at least one government owned and one privately owned 
organisation, plus the probability of being able to respond effectively to the range of 
questions covered in the initial interview and subsequent survey.  Responding 
effectively might be dictated by being in an industry where measures of efficiency and 
community or service user satisfaction are available.  
It is considered that four case studies of the multiple entity governance model are 
necessary in order to reliably identify the themes of issues, inadequacies and strengths 
of that model of governance.  To cater to the emerging use of PPP’s in Australia at 
least one PPP which required capital investment by the private sector, should be one 
of those four case studies. 
Ideally case studies would include a case where delivery of a significant, core service 
is outsourced to a separate organisation and possibly a case where the complete asset 
management function has been outsourced to an organisation discrete from those 
involved in the governance of the infrastructure asset. 
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Conclusion: 
Engineering infrastructure asset management is confronted by conflicting challenges, 
the shortage of funding to carry out work on existing infrastructure and the 
heightening expectation of the community that the asset will be modified to meet not 
only the current needs of the community but also the needs of future generations.  
Those challenges and the privatisation or application of NPM private sector practices 
to public utilities have collectively led to an understanding that infrastructure assets 
require active stewardship(Tranfield, et al 2004).  
Simultaneous with the gaining of that understanding of the requirement for the 
stewardship role has been the development of an understanding that engineering asset 
management decisions must be both operational and strategic and that the strategic 
asset management decisions must be highly integrated with the other strategic 
decision-making, the governance by the organisation which controls the asset. 
The increasing occurrence of engineering infrastructure asset governance 
arrangements which are constituted of a mix of government owned and privately 
owned organisations has not been matched by the development of knowledge as to the 
advantages or disadvantages of such governance structure.  If the optimum 
combination of roles is identified then it follows that the determination of the 
governance structure for a particular infrastructure asset will be better informed and 
more likely to provide a better stewardship outcome.  
Thus the quality of stewardship outcomes may be affected by the form of governance.  
The proposed research seeks to understand any link between the multi-organisation, 
government owned and privately owned, governance structure and the provision of 
engineering infrastructure assets which meet the needs of the community and future 
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generations, the stewardship outcome.  Ideally this proposed research will advance the 
identification of an optimum governance model, a model which facilitates the 
organisations performing as faithful steward. 
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